We model agents who get utility from their beliefs and therefore interpret information optimistically. While subjectively Bayesian, they exhibit several biases observed in psychoglical studies such as optimism, con…rmation bias, polarization, and the endowment e¤ect.
Introduction
Expectation formation is central to many economic questions. Workers must form expectations regarding retirement. Investors must form expectations of risk and return. Price setters must form expectations of competitor's prices. While expectations are central, we do not fully understand how expectations are formed. The typical approach is to assume that expectations are model consistent. Agents understand the world in which they live and form expectations rationally. There is a lot of psychological evidence, however, that agents are poor information aggregators. It is therefore of interest to develop models of belief formation that go beyond the assumption of rational expectations.
In this paper, we proceed in the spirit of Becker and model beliefs as a choice. Our agents are subjective Bayesians. They accurately combine subjective signals with priors to form subjective posteriors. Their subjective reality is rational. Their problem is that they see the world through rose-colored glasses. They interpret signals optimistically to maximize their expected utility subject to a cost, which might be interpreted as a cost of fooling themselves. Hence their subjective interpretation of the signals di¤ers from the objective counterpart. While subjectively Bayesian, our wishful thinkers will appear non-Bayesian to an objective observer.
Any model of belief choice must specify the costs and the bene…ts of distorting beliefs. In the standard economic model, there is no bene…t to believing anything other than the truth. Agents get utility from outcomes, and probabilities serve only to weight these outcomes. Getting the probabilities wrong muddles one's view of the payo¤s to an action and leads to mistakes. In the standard model, there are strong incentives to have accurate beliefs, since accurate beliefs lead to accurate decisions.
To model the bene…ts of belief choice we follow Jevons (1905) , Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and Leahy (2001) and assume that some portion of utility depends on the anticipation of future outcomes. Anxiety, fear, hopefulness and suspense are all ways in which beliefs about the future a¤ect wellbeing today. The American Psychiatric Association de…nes anxiety as "apprehension, tension, or uneasiness that stems from the anticipation of danger." The dependence of current wellbeing on beliefs about the future creates an incentive to believe that "good"outcomes are more likely than "bad"outcomes. Wishful thinking involves choosing to believe that the truth is what one would like the truth to be.
Without constraints a theory of belief choice would lack content. One could believe anything one liked. Our model of the constraints rests on the idea that there are often lots of possible beliefs that are consistent with experience. We limit our agents to "plausible"beliefs, by which we mean beliefs that are not obviously contradicted by the available evidence. We follow Hansen and Sargent (2008) and impose a cost to beliefs that are too far away from the truth, where we associate the truth with the beliefs that an objective observer would hold. This cost is related to the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the agents subjective beliefs to the objective probability distribution. The Kullback-Leibler divergence measures the likelihood that the subjective beliefs would be rejected in favor of the objective ones. model given current beliefs. The more unlikely the truth, the more costly the beliefs. We consider two formulations of this cost. In the …rst, which occupies much of the body of the paper, we place the cost on the interpretation of the ‡ow of new information. This corresponds to the idea that agents "see the world through rose colored glasses." In this formulation, the agent interprets signals sequentially. Later we also consider a formulation in which the agent evaluates all information at once. Each formulation has its advantages and disadvantages, which we discuss in detail.
The outcome is a model of belief choice. Optimal beliefs tend to twist the probabilities in the direction of events with high utility. The upper bound on probabilities limits wishful thinking about very likely events. Events can only be so likely. While unlikely events with high payo¤s receive more weight, wishful thinking is not magical thinking. Low probability events remain low probability and zero probability events remain zero probability. Wishful thinking is strongest when payo¤ di¤erences are large and outcomes are uncertain. Such situations might plausibly include choices that are made infrequently so that the agent lacks experience with them such as saving for retirement. They might also include situations in which the options are di¢ cult to value such as the valuation of real estate where every house is in some sense a unique asset and few houses trade at any given time. They might include any situation in which there are multiple theories on the table and very little evidence to distinguish between them as is often the case with asset bubbles. 1 While our wishful thinkers are subjective Bayesians, they may exhibit a number of deviations from rationality often observed in the experimental literature. Our wishful thinkers will tend to be overcon…dent. To the extent that more accurate decisions yield greater payo¤s, they will overestimate the probability that they have made the correct decision and they will underestimate con…dence intervals. Our wishful thinkers will tend interpret information in ways that accord with their priors, a phenomenon known as con…rmation bias. To the extent that their priors are the result of wishful thinking, both their priors and their interpretation of information will be twisted in similar ways by their desire to believe that the state is good. Two wishful thinkers with very di¤erent payo¤s may interpret the same information in fundamentally di¤erent ways. Each may interpret the information in a way that is favorable to them. It is even possible that each becomes more con…dent that their view of the world is correct, a phenomenon known as polarization.
While wishful thinkers may appear non-Bayesian to an objective observer, their world view is internally coherent. This allows us to apply the standard decision theory tool kit. They maximize the present value of subjective expected utility. Conditional on their interpretation of information, they …lter their subjective signals correctly.
Our premise is that people shade their beliefs in ways that make their choices look better. There is evidence that supports this assertion. In a classic study of cognitive dissonance, Knox and Inkster (1968) interviewed bettors at a race track and found that bettors placed higher odds on their preferred horse when interviewed after placing their bets than bettors did when interviewed while waiting to place their bets. Knox and Inkster attribute this phenomenon to a desire to reduce post-decision dissonance, that is a desire to match one's world view with ones decisions. Mijovic-Prelec and Prelec (2010) perform a similar analysis in a more controlled setting. They had subjects make incentivized predictions before and after being given stakes in the outcomes, and found that there was a tendency for subjects to reverse their predictions when the state that they had predicted to be less likely turned out to be the high payo¤ state. Bastardi, Uhlmann, and Ross (2011) conduct a standard test of con…rmation bias, but instead of focusing on the relationship between one's prior beliefs and their interpretation of evidence, they instead focus on the one's prior decisions. They consider a population of parents who profess to believe that home care is superior to day care for their children. Some, however, have chosen home care. Others, because they have jobs, have chosen day care. They present this population with two …ctional studies, one of which claims home care is superior and one which claims day care is superior. The parents who had placed their children in day care rated the study supporting day care as superior, whereas the parents who cared for their children at home did the opposite. Some of the parents who had placed their children in day care changed their beliefs and professed day care was no worse than home care. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents a simple model of belief choice and discusses its implications for belief choice and action choice. We show that wishful thinking naturally leads to optimism, con…rmation bias, polarization, and situations in which the order of information matters. Section 4 discusses a number of issues, including alternative modeling choices and the relationship to the literature on robust control. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
We contribute to three literatures. The …rst is the literature on belief choice which is surveyed by Benabou and Tirole (2016) . They divide the literature into two classes depending on the motivation for distorting one's beliefs. In one class, beliefs enter directly into utility. In the other beliefs are instrumental in motivating desirable actions or achieving desirable goals. For example, beliefs may aid in overcoming self-control problems, signaling one's type, or fostering commitment. Our paper …ts into the …rst class. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) is a prominent early example. They present the example of an agent considering a job in a hazardous industry. Upon accepting the job the agent may choose to understate the probability of an accident in their industry. This is desirable since it reduces fear, and fear reduces utility. The cost of distorting beliefs is that mistaken beliefs may lead to suboptimal decisions in subsequent periods. For example, the agent may choose to forgo safety equipment if it became available. Akerlof and Dickens do not model the cost of distorting beliefs. Rather they constrain the subjective probability of an accident to be less than the objective probability. This leads to bang-bang solutions depending whether the cost or the bene…t is greater. They assume that the agent evaluate these options with the true probabilities when considering belief choice. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) is another closely related paper. They assume that an agent makes a once and for all belief choice in period zero and then given this prior behaves as a Bayesian in all subsequent periods. They model belief choice as balancing the gain to anticipating a more positive future and against the cost of suboptimal decisions. Like Akerlof and Dickens the agent evaluates belief choice using the true probability distribution. We discuss the relationship between our model and Brunnermeier and Parker's in detail in Section 4 below.
A second literature is the literature on anticipatory feelings. Jevons (1905) , Loewenstein (1987) and Leahy (2001,2004 ) all suppose that current happiness depends in some way on future outcomes. Jevons believed that agents acted only to maximize current happiness. Intertemporal optimization, in this view, balanced the happiness from actions today against the current happiness arising from the anticipation of future actions. Loewenstein builds a model to explain why an agent might wish to bring forward an unpleasant experience to shorten the period of dread, or to postpone a pleasant experience in order to savor the anticipation. Caplin and Leahy model emotional responses to future risks such as anxiety, suspense, hope, and fear. Brunnermeier and Parker build on the utility function in Caplin and Leahy.
Our paper also contributes to the recent explosion of work that deviates from rational expectations. A partial and incomplete selection include the following. Hansen and Sargent (2008) consider robust expectations that incorporate a fear of model mis-speci…cation. Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010) propose what they call "natural expectations" which involve a weighted average of rational expectations and the prediction of a simple linear forecasting model. Gabaix (2014) considers a "sparsity-based"model in which agents place greater weight on variables that are of greater importance. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Schleifer (2018) consider what they call "diagnostic expectations". These are based on what psychologists call the representative heuristic and involve an overweighting of outcomes that are becoming more likely.
A Simple Model of Belief Choice
The essential elements of the theory are: (1) a decision whose outcome is unknown; (2) objective probabilities of the outcome; (3) utility from beliefs regarding the outcome; and (4) a cost to choosing beliefs that di¤er from the objective probabilities. We discuss these elements in turn.
There are two periods. In the …rst period, an agent chooses an action a from a …nite set of potential choices A. In the second period, nature selects a state ! from a …nite set of potential states of the world . The agent begins the …rst period with a prior 2 ( ) over second period states. The agent also observes a signal s 2 S in the …rst period. The objective probability of observing s when the state is !, is p(sj!). The agent chooses the action a after observing the signal s. Unless otherwise noted we assume that p(sj!) > 0 for all ! so that the signal is not perfectly informative.
We follow Jevons (1905) and assume that the agent maximizes current utility and that current utility incorporates the anticipation of future outcomes. This is the easiest way to incorporate utility from anticipation. Let u(!; a) denote the utility that the agent receives from the anticipation of action a in state !. The agent chooses the action a that maximizes the subjective expectation of u(!; a). p(sj!). The bene…t of choosing p(sj!) is that it may increase the agent's subjective expected utility. The cost depends on how p(sj!) di¤ers from p(sj!). Rather than model the speci…c technology by which beliefs are distorted, for example by selective memory, selective attention, or self-signalling, we hypothesize that the costs of belief distortion are increasing in the size of the distortion. 3 We …rst invert p(sj!) and p(sj!), so that they become probabilities
We then de…ne the cost of choosing p(!) as the Kullback-Leibler divergence from p(!) to p(!). The information cost is
This cost (1) is the expected likelihood ratio under the subjective measure p. It measures the ability of the agent to discriminate between p and p given that the agent believes that the signal is p. The idea is that it is easier to choose a subjective belief that is not wildly contradicted by experience. is a parameter that captures the ease with which the agent can manipulate their beliefs. The larger is the greater the amount of evidence the agent would need before they reject their chosen beliefs in favor of the objective ones. We also do not take a stand on whether the process of twisting information is conscious or subconscious. Note that we place the cost on the interpretation of the signal rather than the posterior as do Hansen and Sargent. There are advantages to each approach which we discuss in Section 4 below.
Summarizing the above, the agent's maximization problem becomes
The state variables are the prior and the signal s. Given the interpretation of the signal, Bayes rule implies that the subjective posterior of state ! is
The …rst term is the therefore the subjective expected utility of choice a. The second term is the cost of the believing p. Implicit in the maximization problem (2) is the assumption that the agent understands that their interpretation of the signal s will depend on the choice a.
We consider the implications of assuming that the agent is naive in Section 4.
Implications for belief choice
Given that the agent understands the interaction between belief choice and action choice, it does not matter whether the agent chooses beliefs and then actions or actions and then beliefs. We will therefore …x the action and focus, for the time being, on belief choice. Given that the action a is …xed, we write u(!) for u(a; !). The …rst order condition for p(!) implies
where E u(!) is the expectation of u(!) with respect to the subjective posterior , and
is the partial derivative of this expectation with respect to p(!). The derivation of (3) is in the appendix.
According to (3) , the agent distorts their interpretation of the signal. They tend to increase the probability of states when increasing that probability increases expected utility and they reduce the probability of states when reducing that probability increases expected utility. The derivative
, can be written as
According to the term in brackets, the agent tends to raise the probability of states with above average utility (according to the posterior ). This is the essence of wishful thinking.
The agent believes to be true what they would like to be true. According to the ratio in front of the term in brackets, the agent tends to distort beliefs more (in absolute value) if the prior probability of the state is high. Given the cost of distorting beliefs, it does not make sense to waste e¤ort distorting unlikely events.
in (3) is multiplied by . The larger is , the easier it is for the agent to manipulate their interpretation of the signal.
Note that since p a¤ects , it enters both sides of (3). These …rst-order conditions therefore implicitly de…ne p. The next proposition shows that a solution always exists, so (3) is not vacuous. All proofs are in the appendix.
It is possible that there are multiple solutions to (3) . This can happen when
is increasing in p(!), then an increase in p(!) raises both the gain in subjective utility and the cost of belief distortion. In such cases, the agent chooses the solution associated with the highest V ( ; s). In most simulations, this solution has been associated with the most optimistic beliefs.
We now consider two special cases which illustrate the how the model works.
Example with uniform priors
Suppose that the prior is uniform (!) = 1=N where N = j j. In this case it is easy to show that
= u(!), so that the marginal increase in expected utility from increasing the probability of state ! is simply the utility in that state. The …rst-order condition (3) simpli…es dramatically
Note that (4) pins down p(!) uniquely. The optimal choice of p distorts the true probability distribution p in the direction of the more desirable states.
Example with two states
Suppose that there are two states ! H and (3) can be written as,
In this case, p H still appears on both sides of the equation, but the assumption of two states eliminates much of the interaction between states and allows us to state the comparative static results cleanly. We collect these in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 With two states:
3. p H is strictly increasing in .
4. p H is strictly increasing in p H .
p H is strictly increasing in
Point (1) is the essence of wishful thinking: the subjective interpretation of the signal is more optimistic than the objective interpretation, which implies that the subjective posterior will also be more optimistic. Point (2) states that the extent of wishful thinking is increasing in the relative payo¤ of the desirable state. Point (3) states that wishful thinking is decreasing in cost parameter 1= . Point (4) re ‡ects the e¤ect of the objective probabilities on the subjective probabilities. Finally, point (5) re ‡ects the sensitivity of the posterior with respect to the signal.
Two states also allows us to sharpen our characterization of when (3) Point 1, H > L ; is su¢ cient for the right-side of (5) to be decreasing in p H . Point 2 is su¢ cient for the derivative of the right-side of (5) to be less than one. In general, multiple solutions are more likely if or u H u L are high and H is low. All of these increase the response of E u(!) to p H . Figure 1 graphs p(!) as a function of p(!) for an example with two states and a uniform prior. The prior probability of the high utility state ! H is on the horizontal axis. The solid line represents the chosen probability as measured on the vertical axis. The gap between the solid line and the dashed 45 degree line represents the extent of wishful thinking,
. Since the state is good, this gap is everywhere positive. The constraint that probabilities are less than one, limits the amount of wishful thinking when the good state is very likely. It is hard to be over-optimistic about a near certain event. For example, Germans may be optimistic about their team's chances to win the FIFA world cup, but this does not necessarily re ‡ect wishful thinking. Similarly, it is hard to be too optimistic about very uncertain events. Wishful thinking in this case is not magical thinking. If p H is zero, then p H and so will be H . Once the US team has been eliminated from the world cup, it is di¢ cult to for Americans to fantasize about their winning the tournament. With uniform priors, the posterior is equal to the interpretation of the signal: H = p H . In this case, Figure 1 also tells us how the subjective posteriors di¤er from the objective posteriors.
Wishful thinking is strongest when the signal is ambiguous. The situations in which we are likely to see wishful thinking are situations in which it is di¢ cult to know the value of an option, such as the purchase of a house, or the agents have little experience, such as retirement, or there are multiple theories on the table, such as when there are trends in the data.
It is easy to show that in this example with uniform priors, the di¤erence between p H and p H peaks at p H < . Figure 2 illustrates the e¤ect of the prior. The black line shows p H as a function of p H when the prior is uniform and the parameters are as in Figure 1 . The green line shows the e¤ect of increasing H to :75. As stated in Proposition 2, the increase in H increases p H for low values of p H and reduces p H for high values of p H . The red line shows that reducing H to :25 has the opposite e¤ect. This e¤ect on the prior carries over to the posterior. Figure 3 shows the resulting posteriors as function of p H . The green line in Figure 3 is slightly above the green line in Figure 2 because the higher prior leads to a higher posterior. The red line in Figure 3 is lower than the red line in Figure 2 for similar reasons. Overall, the posteriors react in much the same way as the interpretation of the signal. 
Action Choice
We can calculate the value of the action a under the optimal beliefs. Substituting (3) into V ( ; s) for a given action choice a,
In the case with uniform priors this simpli…es to
This has the form of Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences, f 1 (Eff (u(!)g) where f (x) = exp(x).
Given that exp(x) is convex, the agent has a preference for late resolution to uncertainty. This is not surprising as it is uncertainty that allows the agent to engage in wishful thinking.
Implications
Our wishful thinkers are subjective Bayesians, but they will appear to be non-Bayesian to an objective observer. In this section, we argue that many apparent deviations from Bayes rule such as overcon…dence, conformation bias, polarization, the endowment e¤ect, and the e¤ect of the order of information may be natural implications of wishful thinking.
Overcon…dence
Debondt and Thaler (1995) write, "Perhaps the most robust …nding in the psychology of judgement is that people are overcon…dent". Experimental tests of overcon…dence take several forms. In one type of experiment, an agent is asked to choose the correct answer from a set of potential answers and then asked their subjective probability of getting choosing the correct answer. In this case, overcon…dence takes the form of optimism and arises when the subject's subjective probability of being correct exceeds the observed frequency with which they in fact answer correctly. Another set of experiments asks for a numerical answer to a question and for a subjective con…dence interval. In this case, overcon…dence takes the form of excess precision and arises when the correct answer fails to lie in the subjective con…dence interval as often as believed.
The spirit of these tests can be captured in a tracking problem in which the agent must guess the state after receiving a signal. Suppose that there are N states labeled ! 1 through ! N equally spaced around a circle, so that the distance between ! 1 and ! 2 is equal to the distance between ! 1 and ! N . Nature picks the true state! 2 , and the agent picks a 2 . Let (a;!) denote the minimum distance (about the circle) between the true state and the choice and suppose that u depends only on : u(a;!) = u( (a;!)). This payo¤ function captures both types of experiment. In the …rst case, there is a correct answer and a collection of incorrect answers. For example, u( ) = 1 if = 0 and u( ) = 0 otherwise. In the second case, the loss is increasing in the . Suppose that the prior is uniform and that the signal has an objective distribution that is symmetric about the true state. The symmetry of the signal implies that p(!j! = s + x) = p(!j! = s x) for all x. Given the symmetry of the problem, the optimal choice is obvious: the agent simply reports the signal: a = s. The question that we focus on is what the agent chooses to believe. 
Given the uniform prior, (3) becomes
, so that p inherits the symmetry of p and . Second, since u is maximized at = 0,
for all ! n 6 = ! 0 . It follows immediately that p(! 0 ) > p(! 0 ), so that the agent is over-optimistic that they have selected the correct state. Finally, if we consider any subset of states relatively close to ! 0 , = f! n jn < N g,
for any ! n 2 and ! m 6 2 . Hence the agent will be overcon…dent that the true state is in . It follows that the agent will be over-con…dent in the sense that their subjective con…dence intervals will be too tight.
A simple model of entry
To see the e¤ects of over con…dence consider a simple model of entry. A …rm contemplates entry into a market. Upon entry the …rm will produce a unit ‡ow of a consumption good. There is no option of exit. In period one, the price of the consumption good is normalized to one. In period 2, the price will either rise to q H > 1 or fall to q L < 1 where it will remain forever. The …rm receives a signal in period 1. Given the signal the objective probability that the price will be q H is p H . The …rm discounts future revenue by a factor . There is an entry cost k. We assume that k > 1 + 1 q L so the …rm does not wish to enter if the price falls.
Using the objective probabilities the …rm would enter in period 1 if
The left-hand side is the expected value of immediate entry. The right-hand side is the expected value of waiting. This condition reduces to
The left-hand side is the lost revenue from waiting. The right-hand side is the gain from delaying the entry cost and the losses that can be avoided should the …rm refrain from entering in the low state. It is immediate that entry is more likely the higher is p H and that q H has no e¤ect on the entry decision. Now consider how the wishful thinker will behave. Suppose that their prior is uniform. There are two states ! H is associated with the high price and ! L with the low price. If the …rm enters than the payo¤ in the high state is 1 + 1 q H k and in the low state is
Their optimal belief conditional on entry is therefore
Similarly we can calculate subjective beliefs conditional on waiting. In this case, the payo¤ in the high state is 1 1 q H k and in the low state is zero. Their optimal belief conditional on entry is therefore
H as the desire to believe in the high state is mitigated by the option to remain inactive should the low state occur.
The entry criterion becomes
Wishful thinking has several e¤ects on the entry condition. the perceived gain to avoiding entry in the bad state is less. The right-hand side is less than before. It follows immediately that the …rm is more likely to enter. Moreover, entry depends positively on the price in the good state, as this price a¤ects the desirability of distorting beliefs.
Con…rmation bias
Con…rmation bias occurs when an agent interprets information in a way that con…rms thier priors. Wishful thinking occurs when an agent interprets information in a way that enhances their subjective utility. The connection between wishful thinking and con…rmation bias rests on the observation that the agent's prior is itself the result of wishful thinking in the past and hence likely correlated with payo¤s.
To illustrate con…rmation bias, consider the example with two states, ! 1 and ! 2 . Consider two agents, one of whom receives high utility from state ! 1 and the other receives high utility in state ! 2 . According to Proposition 2, both will twist signals in the direction of their preferred state. Now suppose that the agents unexpectedly receive additional signals. Again applying Proposition 2, each agent will again twist the signals in the direction of their preferred state, which will also be the direction of their priors.
Most tests of con…rmation bias take the priors as given and evaluate how an agent interprets additional information. They do not consider the agent's subjective utility. It is therefore di¢ cult to know whether the interpretation is being in ‡uenced by the prior beliefs or whether both beliefs and the interpretation are being in ‡uenced by payo¤s. A few studies attempt to disentangle the e¤ects of beliefs and payo¤s. Mijovic-Prelec and Prelec (2010) had subjects make incentivized predictions before and after being given stakes in the outcomes. There was a tendency for subjects to reverse their predictions when the state that they had predicted to be less likely turned out to be the high payo¤ state. Bastardi, Uhlmann, and Ross (2011) consider a population of parents with similar priors: all profess to believe that home care is superior to day care for their children. They di¤er, however, in their payo¤s, as some have chosen home care for their children, while others have chosen day-care. They …nd that the interpretation of evidence aligns with the payo¤s rather than the prior. The parents who had placed thier children in day care rated the study supporting day care as superior, whereas the parents who cared for their children at home did the opposite. In both of these studies, the interpretation of information appears to be more responsive to payo¤s than priors. This does not imply that priors do not matter, but only that wishful thinking might be present as well.
Polarization
Polarization occurs when two agents with opposing beliefs see the same signal and each becomes more convinced that their view is the correct one. Wishful thinkers can exhibit polarization if they place di¤erent values on the states and the information that they receive is su¢ ciently ambiguous. Consider again a situation with two agents and two states. Suppose that agent i receives utility u H in state ! 1 and u L in state ! 2 and agent j receives utility u H in state ! 2 and u L in state ! 1 . In keeping with our discussion of con…rmation bias, suppose that each has received some information in the past that they have interpreted optimistically, so that agent i has a prior that places weight H > 1 2 on state ! 1 , and agent j places the same prior on state ! 2 . Each then sees the same signal s which has objective probability p. Each interprets the signal according to (5) . Agent i ends up with the posterior
and agent j ends up with the posterior
Polarization occurs if i (! 1 ) > H and j (! 1 ) < 1 H . so that both agents have observed the same signal and each has become more con…dent in thier assessment of the state. Now
Since e
, it follows immediately that polarization is possible, and that polarization is more likely (at least in this example) when the objective odds
are close to even and when u H u L is large. In other words, polarization tends to occur with the signal is uninformative and the desire to believe is large.
Order of information
Consider an agent who receives a signal, interprets it according to (3) and then receives a second signal, which they also interpret according to (3) . Suppose that the two signals when considered together are uninformative. Does the order of information matter?
It is clear that if the agent makes a decision between receiving the two signals, then the order of information will matter. The …rst signal will a¤ect the agent's choice and that choice will in ‡uence the interpretation of both signals. Change the order of the signals and one would likely alter the choice and hence the interpretation.
Yet even if there is no choice the order of the signals will matter. Consider a wishful thinker how receives two signals in succession. Suppose that the second signal is unanticipated, since whether a signal is anticipated or unanticipated would not a¤ect a Bayesian. For simplicity suppose that the prior is uniform and that there are two states
The posterior after the …rst signal is
The posterior after the second signal is
Discussion

Sophistication vs naïveté
We have chosen to model sophisticated agents that are aware of how choices a¤ect their beliefs. When choosing an action in the decision problem (2), the agent foresees that their beliefs will change and takes this into consideration. Another possibility is that agents are naive. They may not consider or may not be aware of how their choices a¤ect their beliefs.
Most of the phenomenon considered above would still be apparent if the agent were naive. Optimism, overcon…dence and polarization only depended on the choice of beliefs, not the choice of actions. naïveté, however, gives rise to additional phenomenon such as the foot-in-the-door technique .
The "foot-in-the-door technique"involves getting a person to make a big decision by …rst having them make a similar decision on a smaller scale. As an example consider a world with two states ! H and ! L . Suppose ! H is more likely, H > L . Consider a gamble in which the agent gets x if the state is ! H and x otherwise. Suppose that utility, u(x), is increasing and concave. Then it is possible that the agent would choose the gamble for small x and avoid the gamble for larger x. It is also possible that upon choosing the gamble for small x, the agent's belief H would rise enough that the agent would now be willing to take the larger gamble.
An alternative cost function
We have chosen to place the information cost on the interpretation of the signal. Agents interpret signals and then update their beliefs. The interpretation is potentially biased. The updating process is Bayesian. Agents a¤ect their posterior beliefs by manipulating the ‡ow of information.
An alternative approach would be assume that agents can manipulate the stock of information not only the ‡ow. This alternative approach suggests placing the information cost on the posterior itself: world views that deviate from objective reality are costly. This approach is equivalent to assuming that the agent reevaluates all of thier past signals simultaneously each period. Our approach above, in contrast, is to consider each signal sequentially.
A cost function that places the cost on the posterior would look like:
where is the objective interpretation of the state given the history of signals and (!) is the subjective posterior. This is the cost function employed by Hansen and Sargent albeit to model pessimism rather than optimism. The agent's maximization problem becomes
Here we have replaced the signal s and the prior with the objective posterior which aggregates all past information. The optimal choice of beliefs then implies:
and the value choosing action a becomes
These equations are the same as those in Hansen and Sargent except for the sign of .
We will refer to our earlier approach with the cost function (1) as the sequential cost model and the approach in this section with the cost function (7) as the cumulative cost model.
There are advantages and disadvantages of each modelling approach. Placing the cost on posterior beliefs as in the cumulative cost model leads to an algebraically simpler solution which may prove useful in dynamic applications. The cumulative cost model can also explain many of the observed deviations from rational behavior that are explained by a the sequential cost model. For example, the agents in the cumulative cost model are optimistic and overcon…dent.
The cumulative cost model can also explain some phenomenon that the sequential cost model cannot. For example, the cumulative cost model can explain the endowment e¤ect: that a person values and object more highly when it is in their possession. The cumulative cost model explains the endowment e¤ect through a revision in beliefs. Once in possession of the object, the agents payo¤s change and this leads directly to a revision of the posteriors (8). Since the agent in the sequential cost model manipulates the ‡ow of information and not the stock of information, the sequential cost model can only explain the endowment e¤ect if the person who receives the object also receives a signal that they can manipulate.
There are also disadvantages to the cumulative cost model. It has more di¢ culty explaining con…rmation bias and polarization. The reason is that subjective posteriors are closely tied to objective posteriors in (8). News that raises (!) will tend to raise (!) for all agents.
There are other di¤erences in the two approaches. Agents in the sequential cost model are subjective Bayesians and appear non-Bayesian to an objective observer. Agents in the cumulative cost model maximize (9). They therefore appear to be objective Bayesians with an Epstein-Zin utility function. If one attempts to elicit their subjective beliefs, however, these subjective beliefs will appear non-Bayesian.
Beliefs are more stable in the sequential cost model. They evolve with the ‡ow if information. Beliefs can potentially change dramatically in the cumulative cost model. If an agent chooses action a, and the payo¤ to action a changes, then the agent will alter their beliefs even if they have not received any new information.
Robustness or Wishful Thinking
Hansen and Sargent (2008) model agents as pessimistic. Their agents are concerned that their model of the economy is inaccurate, and seek to make sure that their decisions are robust to plausible alternatives. This leads to an optimization problem very similar to (??), but the cost (7) enters with the opposite sign and the agent …rst minimizes with respect to beliefs before maximizing with respect to actions. Not surprisingly, this leads to very di¤erent behavior. The agent distorts beliefs toward the low payo¤ states instead of the high payo¤ states, and behaves as if they have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty rather than late resolution of uncertainty.
Which model is a better is a better model of human behavior is not an easy question to answer. Each model is supported by its own body of psychological evidence and each performs well on in certain domains and poorly in others. The psychological justi…cation for robustness is that it is consistent with ambiguity aversion and generates a preference for late resolution of uncertainty which many …nd plausible. The economic justi…cation for robustness is that a preference for robustness generates risk sensitive preferences which help to explain the behavior of asset prices, in particular the equity premium.
As discussed above, there is also psychological evidence that agents distort beliefs in the direction of payo¤s, and the psychological evidence in favor of optimism is at least as strong as that in favor of ambiguity. And while robustness appears to help explain asset pricing behavior, there are many economic situations where are better explained by wishful thinking. Entrepreneurs, for example, appear optimistic. According to Daniel Kahneman, "A lot of progress in the world is driven by the delusional optimism of some people. " Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelburg (1988) …nd that two thirds of entrepreneurs believe that their …rm will fare better than similar …rms run by others. Hamilton (2000) …nds that the median earnings of entrepreneurs is 35% less than would they would be predicted to earn in alternative jobs. Dropping out of Harvard to develop a social networking site as Mark Zuckerberg did would appear much more consistent with optimism than a preference for robustness.
Payday lending is another area that would appear more consistent with optimism than robustness. Payday loans typically accrue about 18% over a period of two weeks or an annualized value of over 7000%. Borrowers appear to be overoptimistic regarding their ability to repay and end up rolling loans over multiple times. Borrowers tend to be optimistic regarding how many times they will roll over debt. Finally politicians rarely crow about the robustness of their policies, preferring instead to emphasize the optimistic outcomes.
It is a question for future research when people exhibit a preference for robustness and when people engage in wishful thinking.
Brunnermeier and Parker
The most closely related paper is Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) . That paper like our paper presents a model of belief choice in which the bene…t of belief choice is that beliefs enter directly into utility. Their agents like our agents are subjective Bayesians. Their model leads to many of the same phenomenon such as optimism and overcon…dence.
There are, however, several di¤erences. First, the two papers model the costs of belief choice in very di¤erent ways. Brunnermeier and Parker focus on how optimistic beliefs might lead to suboptimal decisions. In their model there is an initial period in which the agent chooses their prior. In subsequent periods, the agent observes the world, updates their information as would a Bayesian and makes decisions. The period-zero agent balances the utility gain from choosing an optimistic prior against the against the mistakes that result from this mistaken prior. They use the objective probabilities to weight outcomes. Our agents do not consider the costs that arise from mistaken beliefs. Instead we place the cost in how far their beliefs deviate from the objective evidence.
Second, while agents in both models are subjective Bayesians, they deviate from objective Bayesians in di¤erent ways. In Brunnermeier and Parker, agents have an incorrect prior, but their interpretation of evidence accords with objective reality. In our model, agents may or may not have an incorrect prior, it is there interpretation of signals that is overly optimistic.
Third, Brunnermeier and Parker model a once and for all choice of beliefs. All belief choice occurs in the initial period. Our agents twist each and every signal that they receive. In Brunnermeier and Parker beliefs a¤ect choices. In our model, choices also mold beliefs.
Conclusion
We model an agent who get utility from their beliefs and therefore interprets information optimistically. While subjectively Bayesian, the agent exhibits several biases observed in psychological studies such as optimism, con…rmation bias, polarization, and the endowment e¤ect.
6 Appendix 6.1 Derivation of (3) Consider the maximization problem (2) for …xed a 2 A. The …rst order condition for p(!) is 0 = (!)u(!)
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint P ! p(!) = 1. Note we do not have to consider the constraint p(!) 0 as this constraint is never binding. Solving for p(!)
Summing over ! implies
[ P ! 00 p(! 00 ) (! 00 )] To complete the derivation note,
where E is the expectation with respect to . Also note that given p 2int ( ), p 2int ( ) so the constraint p(!) 0 is never binding.
Derivation of the Value of action a
Substituting (3) into ( 
look at the term
Proof of the Propositions
Propositon 1 Given and p, there exists a p that satis…es (1) for all ! 2 .
Proof: De…ne the mapping T : ( ) ! ( ). Given any p 2 ( ), substitute into the right hand side of (1), and let T (p) equal the left hand side. Clearly T (p) 2 ( ). Also, T (p) is continuous in p. By Brouwer's …xed point theorem, there exists p 2 ( ) such that T (p) = p: Proposition 2 With two states:
